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ARTICLES
CATALYST, OBSTACLE, OR SOMETHING IN
BETWEEN? DEALING WITH THE LAW IN BUILDING
ETHICAL CORPORATE CULTURE
COUNTESS ALEXANDRA* & TIMOTHY L. FORT**
In 2004, Congress amended the organizational chapter of the U.S.
Federal Sentencing Guidelines to require that corporations create
“organizational culture[s]” leading to “ethic[s]” and “compliance” in
order to obtain the benefits created in the chapter’s encouragement of
compliance systems.1 The amendments occurred after the turn of the
century debacles of companies such as Enron and Worldcom. Congress
recognized that a reflexive governance regime aimed only at punishing
non-compliance misses the levers necessary to create effective compliance systems.2 Paradoxical as it may seem, studies showed companies
that focused on compliance were less effective in complying with the
law than those organizations that incorporated a non-legal set of ethical
duties and aspirations.3
Many companies have since sought to create more ethical business
cultures4 though the riddle of how to measure such affective dimensions remains difficult—as does knowing exactly what prosecutors and
judges may look for in determining the extent of the ethicality of company programs.5 Such riddles are worthy of inquiry and comprise a
* Countess Alexandra is the Countess of Fredriksborg (Denmark) and is a member
of the Board of Directors of Ferring Pharmaceutical. She serves as the Chair of the
Board’s Ethics Committee.
** Professor Fort holds the Eveleigh Professorship of Business Ethics and is Professor of Business Law at the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University. The authors
wish to acknowledge the research assistance of Jason Allen and Kenneth Burleson in the
preparation of this article.
1. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(2) (2004).
2. See JACOB DAHL RENDTORFF, RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICS AND LEGITIMACY OF CORPORATIONS 354 (2009).
3. Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, 72 HARV. BUS. REV. 106
(1994); Dov Siedman, Why Companies Shouldn’t ‘Do’ Compliance, FORBES (May 4, 2012, 11:30
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dovseidman/2012/05/04/why-ceos-shouldnt-docompliance/2/.
4. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Company Eli Lilly to Pay Record $1.415 Billion for Off-Label
Drug Marketing, FDA (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/iceci/criminalinvestigations/
ucm260967.html; see also Karen L. Stewart & Whiton S. Paine, Johnson & Johnson: An Ethical Analysis of Broken Trust, 5 J. ACAD. & BUS. ETHICS 1 (2012). Johnson & Johnson, which
has long had a heralded culture, was subject to a shareholder derivative suit for abandoning the company’s commitment to an ethical culture. The company is now seeking to
re-establish that ethical cultural foundation for its compliance program.
5. See Siedman, supra note 3..
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burgeoning literature in their own right.6 Reference to much of that
literature will be made throughout this paper.
We set out, however, to ask the rare question directed at the other
side of corporate culture: assuming that a company already has a
vibrant ethical culture, what stance should the company take toward a
greater integration of the law? At first blush, it is worth asking why a
company would rely more fully on legal requirements if an ethical culture is functioning well. To be sure, some companies have hosted a
well-regarded, trustworthy corporate culture, only to see indiscretions
tarnish the company’s reputation and lead to a greater reliance on the
law thereafter.7 Yet, such instances do not get to the heart of the question. Legal wrongdoing, even if a company has previously had a pristine reputation, remains legal wrongdoing and suggests that stricter
laws and rules are necessary to prevent future wrongdoing. Our question goes further: why would a company rely on the law even if it has
had no, or almost no, legal issues?
One answer is preventative. Simply because some strategies do
work does not mean that they cannot be improved and so some may
turn to legal principles in order to stay at the cutting edge of ethical
issues. While intellectually plausible, we have not found instances of
companies following such a line of reasoning.
The more likely answer lies in the possibility that as companies
grow and expand, they confront both new legal regimes, as well as
increasingly diverse workforces with norms and values different from
those of the company’s original culture. This statement should not be
interpreted as condescending. Instead, it should be read as a real-world
recognition that if cultures differ—and they clearly do—then some
kind of articulation of the values and norms of an organization is necessary to inform all relevant parties in a company as to what constitutes
expected behavior.
Such policy and rule-making inevitably takes on the character,
explicitly or implicitly, of law-making. Assuring that the company complies with legal regulations when entering new countries also calls for
corporate leaders to explicitly articulate and institute those processes
necessary to be compliant. For example, a small South American company may have a vibrant, trustworthy, ethical culture, but if it expands
to the United States its informal customs and values may not obtain any
recognition so as to be in compliance with the Sentencing Guidelines.
Accordingly, companies may rely on the law in order to obtain access to
the large economic markets.
6. See, e.g., David Hess, Robert S. McWhorter & Timothy L. Fort, The 2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of
Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725 (2006); see also David Hess, A Business
Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1781 (2007).
7. See, e.g., Anita Raghavan, In Scandal’s Wake, McKinsey Seeks Culture Shift, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/business/self-help-at-mckinsey
.html?_r=0.
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To some, however, law undermines the very essence of ethics itself.
Philosophers often view the heart of moral agency as rooted in an individual desire to undertake proper activity because of the inherent good
of the principle in question, not because failure to do so might subject
them to criminal or civil liability.8 Outside of this Kantian perspective,
others have argued that to the extent the law takes away moral choices
and places them within the province of governmental responsibility,
individual moral achievement and growth can be undermined as well.9
Thus, our task is to assess many of the same materials and literature
often used in the ethics-law culture question, but from this unique perspective we seek to find a way in which the law’s necessary and, optimally, supportive function does not inhibit more robust behaviors and
attitudes enculturated within organizations that authentically seek
moral goods.
In doing so, our aim is four-fold. First, an answer to this question
should be beneficial for companies addressing this precise problem.
Second, the uniqueness of our approach to the question may well shed
light on the more typical question of how to integrate ethics into legal
compliance programs. That is, if we know the dangers of the law to
good cultures, that might allow us to nuance the application of law (for
those compliance-driven) in order for them to also achieve an optimal
balance among economics, law, and affectivity. Third, we expect that
analyzing this question will also provide insight as to optimal governance structures that provides room for the ethics component in corporate culture regardless of the starting point from which one asks this
question. Finally, we will suggest that this analysis provides insight for
government regulators and regimes if their aim is to, indeed,
encourage companies to act more responsibly.
To make this argument, our paper is divided into four parts. In
Part I, we review the literature to date that sets out the building blocks
for an ethical corporate culture. Economics, Law, and Affectivity comprise these three building blocks. The balance among these three is the
heart of debates that fill PowerPoint screens in boardrooms and classrooms on corporate governance, television screens on corporate scandals, and movie screens that articulate a popular culture narrative of
the oxymoronic nature of the term business ethics.
In Part II, we provide an overview of research on the factors that
impact corporate culture. This research highlights the importance of
affectivity—the emotional desire to achieve good—in creating positive
cultures as well as the entropic threat of reliance on law and economics
to produce the same. As part of this, we construct a matrix that demon8. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 19–20
(1797); see also Bill Shaw & John Corvino, Hosmer and the “Why Be Moral?” Question, 6 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 373 (1996).
9. See Michael Novak, Wealth & Virtue: The Moral Case for Capitalism, NAT’L REV.
(Feb. 18, 2004, 9:13 AM), http://old.nationalreview.com/novak/novak2004021809
13.asp; see also PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE
ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
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strates common factors that appear in this research. This research will
point to some important challenges for corporate governance.
In Part III, we build on these findings to further analyze the importance of the affective dimension of ethics and corporate culture. The
legal and economic dimensions are relatively well understood and covered in Part I, but we believe that there is a dearth of understanding of
how affective aspects of ethics and culture relate to the other two
sectors.
In Part IV, we conclude with our recommendation of how the legal
and economic dimensions can have their rightful place within corporate culture without undermining the ethical orientation that companies either seek to retain or to build.
I.

A TRI-PARTITE MODEL

OF

ETHICS, LAW,

AND

BUSINESS

Illegal business behavior is not new, nor is unethical business conduct. As long as there has been trade, opportunities have existed for
cheating. One need only look to ancient sacred scriptures to see the
recognition of such cheating with regulations and punishments set to
deter it. Legal scholar Reuven Avi-Yonah has also traced the notion of
corporate social responsibility to Roman antiquity, arguing in part that
governments provided companies with the benefit of limited liability in
exchange for engaging in activities that benefited the public.10
Economists delve into this history as well. F.A. Hayek, for instance,
comments that if two people in an ancient time met in an isolated area,
one party might kill or steal from the other and, if the person could get
away with it, he or she might just do that. However, to the extent a
community exists, sanctions will be imposed on the killer/cheater
because it is not in the long-term self-interest of the members of the
community to allow such behavior to occur. What is in their self-interest is trading as opposed to killing and stealing—and what fosters trading is for people to honor their promises. Thus, business has a natural
interest in ethics and in the societal need to police bad behavior.11
This tension among law, ethics, and business thus stretches deep
into human history and has its modern form today. What has arguably
made the tension more acute is the rise of large business organizations
combined with liquid global markets. Many commentators have noted
that when management becomes separated from ownership, a new
dynamic is introduced to corporate governance. A company with a
dominant majority shareholder or a family-owned business will likely
10. In early American legal history, incorporation was granted only when businesses
demonstrated a social good that would occur through chartering; common examples
included ferry services or the formation of municipalities. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005).
11. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM 47 (1988)
(citing Hume’s contention that the market creates incentive “even [for] bad men to act
for the public good”).
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take on the values of the founder and owner(s).12 In such cases, the
differences between the leader’s personal values and those of the company are not likely to be dissonant and messages concerning appropriate behaviors will more easily flow through the organization.13
However, when companies undertake their initial public offering,
the game changes. New investors enrich the company’s capital structure (as well as providing cash for the founders). New shareholders
possess the same rights to voice their views as to how the governance of
a company should proceed, with a primary value of all the shareholders
frequently narrowing to economic performance. Some companies take
steps to preserve their traditional way of doing business at the time of
an IPO and so some values—including non-economic values—may persist in a company’s culture over a long period of time.
A prominent example of this is the aforementioned case of Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”). When the company made its public offering in
1944, the founders attempted to perpetuate the company’s (and founding family’s) values through J&J’s Corporate Credo, which set out
duties and aspirations for the company that were lead by service to, in
order, customers, employees, communities, governments, and finally to
shareholders.14 The company conducted training around the Credo
for decades, making it a criterion for hiring and promotion decisions as
well as daily conduct for J&J employees.15 The pervasiveness of the
Credo in J&J’s culture was given significant credit for J&J’s famous 1982
decision to pull its best-selling brand, Tylenol, off the shelves nationwide when an outside party sabotaged the product resulting in six Chicago-area deaths.16 J&J’s CEO, James Burke, explained that the
company had to take such a drastic action because “we couldn’t live up
to the Credo.”17 At the time, that unforced recall was considered to be
a questionable business action tantamount to admitting guilt, but it
proved to be a brilliant defense of the company’s brand and its lead
product.18
As one public relations executive said, in 1982, no one voluntarily
recalled products.19 Yet, J&J’s action proved to the public that it was a
company that people could trust, keeping its products safe for the public and standing behind its promises. Tylenol had been J&J’s best-sell12. See, e.g., R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH 240–42 (1984).
13. See R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions, 4
BUS. ETHICS Q. 409 (1994).
14. Thomas Moore, The Fight to Save Tylenol (Fortune, 1982), FORTUNE (Oct. 7, 2012,
1:00 PM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2012/10/07/the-fight-to-save-tylenoljames-burke/; see also Our Credo, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, https://www.jnj.com/sites/
default/files/pdf/jnj_ourcredo_english_us_8.5x11_cmyk.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
15. Moore, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Judith Rehak, Tylenol Made a Hero of Johnson & Johnson: The Recall That Started
Them All, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/23/yourmoney/23iht-mjj_ed3_.html.
19. Id.
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ing product, producing seventeen percent of the company’s net
income in 1981.20 Two months after the recall, the company brought
Tylenol back to the market with a market share that had plunged from
37% to 7%. A year later, the market share was back to 30%.21
The move to perpetuate a culture through a Credo has been replicated by other companies22 and while it may often be effective, it also is
a contracting strategy rather than one just based in property. Property
law trumps, however, and the shareholders—as owners of the company—maintain the right to change the governance orientation of a
company, including said contract efforts.23
Liquid global markets place significant pressures toward property
and away from contracts over time in at least two significant ways. With
shareholders moving in and out of company ownership, it seems
unlikely that shareholders buy and sell with full consideration of the
contracting attempts to sustain corporate culture over time. Such
investing decisions—whether by institutional investors, day traders, or
simply by pensioners and individual investors utilizing various mutual
fund options—are more likely to be based on the likelihood of monetary returns.24 To be sure, there are some individual investors and
mutual fund vehicles that will consider issues pertaining to corporate
cultures and values perpetuated by those companies that align with
non-economic interests of potential shareholders.25 Even so, the percentage of such funds remains relatively small26 and even within such
funds, it is difficult to ascertain the particular culture of a given industry. Freeport-McMoran Copper and Gold may be an extractive industry, for example, but its voluntary initiatives to work with stakeholders27
look quite different than other extractives, which have been sued for
violating human rights of native peoples near facilities.28
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Our Core Values, WHOLE FOODS, http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/
mission-values/core-values (last visited Feb. 14, 2014); Verizon Credo, VERIZON, http://
responsibility.verizon.com/verizon-credo/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2014); Company Credo,
DRC INT’L, http://drcworldwide.com/t44/17110/Company-Credo.html (last visited Feb.
14, 2014).
23. TAYLOR WESSING, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: GUIDE TO SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 2
(2012), available at http://www.taylorwessing.com/uploads/tx_siruplawyermanagement/
Shareholder_activism_-_Guide_to_shareholder_rights.pdf.
24. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, DO INVESTORS CARE ABOUT SUSTAINABILITY?
SEVEN TRENDS PROVIDE CLUES (2012).
25. See, e.g., Michael Chamberlain, Socially Responsible Investing: What You Need to
Know, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2013, 3:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/feeonlyplanner/
2013/04/24/socially-responsible-investing-what-you-need-to-know/.
26. Id.
27. See S. Prakash Sethi, et al., Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold, Inc.: An Innovative
Voluntary Code of Conduct to Protect Human Rights, Create Employment Opportunities, and Economic Development of the Indigenous People, 103 J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (2011).
28. See, e.g., David R. Baker, Chevron’s Links to Burma Stir Critics to Demand It Pull Out,
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Oct. 3, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article
/Chevron-s-links-to-Burma-stir-critics-to-demand-2499304.php#page-2; Ivana Sekularac &
Anthony Deutsch, Dutch Court Says Shell Responsible for Nigerian Spills, REUTERS (Jan. 30,
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While many extractives were faced with charges of human rights
abuses, environmental degradation and bullying of governments, for
instance, Freeport took a different approach. It continued to cooperate with the voluntary codes of conduct that members of the industry
sought to create, but it also developed its own code of conduct that
provided protection for the indigenous people on whose land the line
was located, and in providing house, health benefits, and educational
opportunities in formal consultation with representatives of the local
population. It also committed itself to external, independent auditing
of its code of conduct with an obligation to allow reports of these audits
to be made public without interference from the company.29
Liquid markets also place property-orienting pressures on companies because of the shortness of time within which investment decisions
are made. Technology allows near instantaneous trading so that investors can move in and out of the market on an hourly basis.30 That
opportunity furthers investor evaluation of companies on a very shortterm basis rather than a long-term one with monetary returns thus typically taking priority over long-term strategies that emphasize values or
corporate culture.31
These pressures toward short-term economic results—the property
emphasis—are further enhanced by globalization. Investors from
around the globe are likely to bring with them a diversity of values that
may well challenge those that had been enshrined prior to a company’s
IPO.32 And with 24/7 stock trading, the emphasis on ongoing evaluation of companies further enhances short-term monetary
performance.33
In spite of these pressures, the aim to create strong ethical culture
persists, and does so for reasons rooted in the same value sectors: there
is evidence that ethical corporate cultures are economically successful;34 lawmakers consistently pass legislation that attempts to rein in

2013, 8:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/30/us-shell-nigeria-lawsuit-id
USBRE90S16X20130130.
29. Sethi et al., supra note 27.
30. See Jacob Goldstein, Putting a Speed Limit on the Stock Market, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/magazine/high-frequency-traders.html
?_r=0.
31. ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE
APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (2009), available at http://www.
aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_short_state0909_0
.pdf.
32. David Tennant & Claremont Kirton, The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment, Financial Crises and Organizational Culture on Managers’ Views as to the Finance-Growth Nexus, 41 J.
ECON. ISSUES 625 (2007).
33. See, e.g., Bill George, Activists Seek Short-Term Gain, Not Long-Term Value, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 26, 2013, 10:56 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/activistsseek-short-term-gain-not-long-term-value/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
34. See JOSHUA DANIEL MARGOLIS & JAMES P. WALSH, PEOPLE AND PROFITS?: THE
SEARCH FOR A LINK BETWEEN A COMPANY’S SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (2001).
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corporate excesses;35 and the public and civil society continually press
for more responsible behavior from companies as explained below.
A.
1.

The Economics of Ethics

Ethics Embedded Within Economics

Though it may seem that economics focus solely on money, it is
not difficult to find economists making strong connections to ethics.
The utilitarian justification for economics, of course, is not surprising.
This connection between ethics and economics champions an increase
in social welfare as a result of policies such as free trade. The argument, at the heart of most free market economists, is that freer trade
results in more competitive companies, reduces external costs (i.e.
taxes and tariffs), spawns innovation, and increases purchasing power
of consumers, all of which allow societies to become richer, more educated, and healthier, among other positive attributes.36 While socialist
and other non-free market economists debate this perspective,37 and
while there are variations as to the ideal balance of free trade and regulation that are hotly contested, the general view that free trade (of some
degree) increases social welfare is one that currently dominates the
global marketplace.38
The more interesting relationship between ethics and economics is
ontological. Here the argument is that at the core of economics is a
non-economic, ethical dimension that foundationally allows economics
to exist and for trade to develop. Four economists are emblematic of
this relationship.
Adam Smith stands at the forefront of this position.39 Smith, a
moral philosopher, is most remembered for notions such as the “invisible hand” that creates social welfare even when individual bakers and
butchers are acting from their own self-interest.40 Yet, Smith does not
leave the relationship between ethics and economics solely within social
welfare terms. He posits that those individual bakers and butchers also
fill roles as citizens of a society with moral sentiments and obligations
for the well-being of that community.41 Such roles hem in a self-inter35. Narjess Boubakri, Omrane Guedhami, & Oumar Sy, Corporate Governance and
Ultimate Control, in INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BUSINESS SYSTEMS AND BEYOND 394 (J. Jay Choi & Sandra Dow eds., 2008).
36. See, e.g., Chris Scott, NGOs Team Up in Lobbying Push for Global CSR Treaty, PR
WEEK (June 28, 2002), http://www.prweek.com/article/149328/ngos-team-lobbyingpush-global-csr-treaty.
37. MAX BEER, THE LIFE AND TEACHINGS OF KARL MARX 101–03 (1921).
38. In a 2013 study on economic freedom, only 33 out of 177 countries receiving
scores received a ‘repressed’ rating. Denise Bedell, Tina Aridas & Valentina Pasquali,
Economic Freedom by Country—2013 Ranking, GLOBAL FINANCE, http://www.gfmag.com/
component/content/article/119-economic-data/12450-economic-freedom-by-country
html.html#axzz2tLVTmtu7 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
39. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (6th ed. 1790), available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_MoralSentiments_p.pdf; see also PATRICIA
WERHANE, ADAM SMITH AND HIS LEGACY FOR MODERN CAPITALISM (1991).
40. WERHANE, supra note 39, at 165.
41. Id.
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est that only narrowly pursues profit and instead promulgates the regulations that position economic pursuits within a legal framework and
also within ethical boundaries.42
The Austrian economist F.A. Hayek took this connection a step further. Hayek argued that free trade had benefited society in at least two
ways. One of those pertained to how trade allowed the production and
accumulation of more material goods, creating a robust economy and
the positive that aspects go with it (such as employment, better education, better health, etc.).43 In that sense, Hayek’s arguments find themselves well within the utilitarian justification of social welfare already
sketched. Yet, it is when Hayek takes this argument a step further that
he also reveals an ontological foundation of ethics to economics that is
not only instructive for large, macro-based issues, but for issues of ethical corporate culture.
Hayek argues that increased trade leads to international peace.44
His argument is that trade creates relationships. Sustaining trade
requires that those relationships be nourished by some straightforward
ethical practices, such as truth-telling, promise-keeping, and production of high-quality goods and services.45 A virtuous cycle can be created, he argues, with parties recognizing that expanding trade requires
such practices, which leads to more trade, which leads to a wider set of
relationships with a result that parties to a trading system will recognize
both the value of sustaining the trade and also the ethical practices that
sustain them, both logically leading to peace over war.
Part and parcel with the importance of trade, then, is ethics. Interestingly, Hayek’s position does not entail any particular philosophical
commitment to an inherent value of ethics. His approach remains utilitarian in that he values ethics primarily because it allows for this trading
matrix to develop.46 Thus, his justification remains similar to that of
the social welfare utilitarians, but Hayek digs deeper into the mechanics
of the relationship. Hayek also argues that the most efficient way for
individuals to learn the importance of these ethical practices is for institutions of civil society to teach them as having their own innate values; it
is too inefficient for traders to learn this reciprocally supportive relationship through trial and error. Moreover, such inefficiencies mean
that the knowledge gained will likely be after the fact and, thus, too late
to benefit a particular exchange in question.47
A third example comes from the recent work of Robert Frank and
David Rose. In his book, Passions Within Reason, Robert Frank argues
42. Id. at 165–66.
43. See HAYEK, supra note 11, at 39–40.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 41. Indeed, this is one of the reasons that trade embargoes are so controversial. On the one hand, sanctions and embargoes provide a pressure point short of
actual violence and so may provide the necessary pressures for changes without bloodshed. At the same time, the consistent lack of a trading relationship further isolates parties from each other, which may make subsequent peace building efforts more difficult.
46. Id. at 13–14.
47. Id. at 74–75.
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that individuals make decisions on the basis of sentiments and emotion
more than reasoned, economic calculus.48 As he puts it in one famous
passage, “[those] who are sensible about love are incapable of it.”49
Like David Hume before him, Frank recognizes that our emotions tend
to be our first clue in what we should do, ethically and economically,
and those emotions must be part of our understanding of both.50
David Rose has recently argued that economics cannot create social welfare on their own (nor can the law, nor politics).51 As he puts it, there
are many copies of the U.S. Constitution floating around in South
America without many constitutional republics being created.52 He
emphasizes the need for ethics as a non-legal, non-economic discipline
for restraint; guilt, he argues can police aberrant behavior in a way far
more efficient than economics or law and allows economic development to occur. As with the inefficiency and lateness of learning the
economic value of ethics through after-the-fact experience, guilt occurs
too late to police behavior.53
2.

Practitioner Evidence

In sketching these positions, our aim is not to endorse any of them
per se, nor to exhaustively chronicle a vast literature on the subject.
Rather, we aim to highlight the fact that well-regarded economists highlight the connection between these two subjects. The fact that these
economists champion the connection between ethics and economics
logically implies that such a connection would carry over into more
focused assessments of the conduct of business and the ethics businesses must practice. And, indeed, both practitioners and empirical
scholars make this connection as well.
While headlines often go to the scandalous or outrageous business
person and that person’s obsession with wealth and greed, it is also not
difficult to find leaders who would agree with former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan, who in Congressional testimony stated that
in today’s economy, reputation is the key value companies bring to the
market; if they lose that reputation they can also end the company.54
Greenspan’s remarks came on the heels of the turn-of-the-century scandals of Enron and Worldcom and were made with particular reference
48. ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASONS (1988).
49. Id. at 190.
50. Id.; see also Amy M. Schmitter, Hume on the Emotions, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotions-17th18th/LD8Hume.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2014).
51. Interview with David Rose on the Moral Foundations of Economic Behavior,
University of Missouri, St. Louis, EconTalk.org (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://
www.econtalk.org/archives/2012/01/david_rose_on_t.html.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to Congress Before the H.
Comm. On Fin. Services, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Federal Reserve) available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2002/february/testimony.html.
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to the demise of Arthur Andersen.55 One need not search long for
boutique examples of companies with a clear social commitment, such
as Ben & Jerry’s,56 Whole Foods,57 Timberland,58 and many others.
Such commitments do not ensure ethical perfection, but theirs are
companies that do explicitly and consciously set out to integrate ethical
values with their business model. Rankings of most ethical companies
also note large multinationals such as Marriott, Pepsi, Deere, Henkel
AG, Kao, Swiss Re, and Stora Enso among others, have been recognized
multiple times in Forbes annual rankings.59 Indeed, when efforts have
been made to legally require more corporate attention to company
stakeholders, one response has been that a well-run business already is
treating these constituents well and so there is no need for additional
regulation.60 In short, the integration of law, ethics, and economics is
possible in business practice.
3.

Academic Corroboration

Such arguments find empirical, academic support as well. In an
exhaustive study of over eighty other studies that attempted to measure
the relationship between corporate financial performance and corporate social performance, Joshua Margolis and James Walsh found that
there was a weak, positive correlation between the two.61 That is, ethical conduct generally helps a company’s profitability, especially when
measured over the long-term.62 Companies can certainly be profitable
without being ethical, but companies can also successfully integrate the
two and indeed, tend to do slightly better financially when they do.63
Other large-scale studies corroborate these findings as well,64 so that
one can conclude that on the basis of traditional economists, actual
business practice, and academic scholarship, there can be a constructive connection between ethics and economics. Establishing that con55. See James A. Thompson, Greenspan for Dummies, THE ALBION MONITOR (May 17,
2002), http://www.monitor.net/monitor/0205a/copyright/greenspanfordummies.html
(giving a former Wall Street Journal contributor’s perspective on Greenspan and suggesting
that Arthur Andersen’s culpability may have been exaggerated).
56. See Andrea Newell, Ben and Jerry’s Social Mission, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://www.triplepundit.com/2013/04/ben-jerrys-social-mission/.
57. See Charlie Kannel, Corporate Responsibility Spotlight: Whole Foods Market, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2012/09/14/corpo
rate-responsibility-spotlight-whole-foods-ma.aspx.
58. See Aman Singh, Responsible Boots: A Peek into Timberland’s Post-Merger Future,
FORBES (Aug. 2, 2011, 1:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2011/08/02/responsi
ble-boots-a-peek-into-timberlands-post-merger-future/.
59. See Jacquelyn Smith, The World’s Most Ethical Companies, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2013,
2:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/03/06/the-worlds-mostethical-companies-in-2013/.
60. See, e.g., William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
385 (1990); Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis
of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173 (1997).
61. See MARGOLIS & WALSH, supra note 34, at 8, 13.
62. Id. at 10–14.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Marc Orlitzky, Frank L. Schmidt, & Sara L. Rynes, Corporate Social and
Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403 (2003).
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nection becomes critical for the creation and nurturance of corporate
culture.
B.

Legal Requirements Mandating Desired Practices

The old adage that one cannot legislate morality seems to have
fallen on deaf ears of legislators, who regularly adopt laws with very specific moral agendas.65 This should not be especially surprising. Law
and ethics may not be co-terminus, but both seek to encourage certain
behaviors and punish others. While a central argument of our paper is
that the legal enforcement of moral values runs great risks of undermining the vibrancy of ethical corporate culture, the law does have a
place in reining in unethical behavior. Many such regulations exist, but
here are a few examples.
Europe’s commitment to protection of individual privacy led to the
passage of the EU Privacy Directive in 2002.66 The directive sought to
protect EU residents from use of data pertaining to them by businesses
without their explicit consent.67 More recently, the Data Protection
Directive was enacted to provide further privacy protection pursuant to
seven principles: notice to data subjects that data is being collected; the
stated purpose for any use; the preclusion of data disclosure without the
subject’s consent; the security of stored data to prevent abuses; disclosure as to who is collecting data; providing data subjects access to their
data with the right to make corrections to inaccuracies in the data, and
making available measure for the subjects to hold data collectors
accountable.68 Both directives were enacted pursuant to ethical objectives of protections of privacy itself and human rights.69
Another specific European example pertains to gender issues. In
2002, Norway startled European businesses with a proposal requiring
women to hold at least forty percent of executive board positions by
2008, a goal successfully achieved.70 Similar legislation then was considered71 and passed72 by other countries as well. Here again, the laws
65. While a close study of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this paper, consider campaigns on prominent social issues such as the Civil Rights Movement.
66. Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July
2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the
Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri CE LEX:32002L0058:en:NOT (Last visited January 25, 2014).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See DELOITTE, WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-tanzania/Local%20Assets/Documents/
Deloitte%20Article_Women%20in%20the%20boardroom.pdf; see also Judith H. Dobrzynski, How Women Are Getting on European Boards (And Why U.S. Companies Should Care),
FORBES (Dec. 14, 2009, 5:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/14/norway-frenchlegislation-equality-forbes-woman-leadership-executive-boards.html (citing France’s proposed legislation requiring 40% of boards be comprised of women).
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were passed with justificatory aims of equality of opportunity for women
as well as for human rights.73
In addition to specific, regulatory approaches, countries also adopt
reflexive approaches to achieve desired norms. Two notable examples
are the previously mentioned 1991 Amendments to the 1984 Federal
Sentencing Guidelines74 and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, which was
decided in 1998.75 These measures set out strong incentives for companies to adopt internal policies to achieve ethical corporate cultures.
The Burlington Industries Court addressed issues pertaining to sexual
harassment, holding that corporations could be held financially responsible for the harassing activities of its employees. The Court also held
that if corporations had established good-faith practices to address complaints and to train workers on what behavior was unacceptable, it
could require alleged victims to work through the in-house process
before appealing to the Courts.76 Similarly, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines offered reduced financial punishments for companies convicted of federal crimes if the companies had adopted “effective” compliance programs, including codes of conduct, safe places for
employees to make complaints, high-level internal oversight of the program, and self-reporting of violations.77 As with the European examples, the justificatory aims for these legal regimes were grounded in
ethical aims.78
C.
1.

Affective Dimensions

Philosophical Challenges

Philosophers and theologians have debated the rationale for the
motivation to be ethical for millennia. In the famous Ring of Gyges,
Plato foreshadowed J.R.R. Tolkien in positing a magic ring that made
the wearer invisible if the ring was turned a certain way.79 With such
power, Glaucon claimed that no person would resist the temptations to
72. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards: The
Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 127 Q. J. OF ECON. 137,
147 (2012).
73. While these numbers do appear impressive, there are reactions as well. Many
Norwegian businesses privatized after the law took effect to avoid the requirement. Moreover, some have argued that while the law may have increased the number of women in
board seats, it has done little to increase the number of women in corporate executive
positions. See Saleha Moshin, Quota System Failing to Bridge Norway’s Corporate Gender Gap,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 9, 2013, 2:57 PM) http://business.financialpost.com/2013/10/
09/quota-system-failing-to-bridge-norways-corporate-gender-gap/.
74. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 1.
75. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
76. Id. at 770 (citing DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 805 (1980)).
77. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 1.
78. See, e.g., Frank Navran & Edward L. Pittman, Corporate Ethics and Sarbanes-Oxley,
ETHICS RES. CTR. (Dec. 31, 2003), http://www.ethics.org/resource/corporate-ethics-andsarbanes-oxley; Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, Dodd-Frank Act: How Financial Reform May
Be Going Wrong, BUS. ETHICS (June 5, 2011), http://business-ethics.com/2011/06/05/
1821-from-dodd-frank-to-dud-how-financial-reform-may-be-going-wrong/.
79. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC Book II 358d–361d (360 BC), available at http://
www.webpages.uidaho.edu/jcanders/Ethics/ringgygesreadexcerpt.htm.
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steal, usurp the King, and seduce the Queen because, in the final analysis, human beings are ethical only for fear of being caught in the event
of violating social norms.80 Socrates responded by suggesting that
there are more noble desires in humanity.81 This debate—whether
human beings are ethical only in response to external incentives, which
may include avoiding punishment or in receiving economic rewards, or
whether we have a nobler desire to do good—has consumed the minds
of a multitude of philosophers and numerous pages. Not surprisingly, a
consensus emerges that the answer is a mix: humans respond to (positive and negative) external incentives, but there is an aspect of our
human nature that calls us to aspire to more noble desires.
Philosophically, nearly all ethics require a notion of moral
agency.82 Kantian notions of autonomy, for example, require moral
agency for a person to choose actions; indeed, in Kantian philosophy,
the only thing that is purely good is a good will.83 Libertarian political
philosophy similarly eschews government requirements for action,
depending instead on individual choice to determine one’s own
actions.84 Further examples are easily produced.
The very nature of ethics has served as a criticism of bringing ethics
into discussions about business. If making companies behave is dependent upon law, then one could turn to concrete notions of legal regulation rather than more ethereal notions of ethics.85 Robert Prentice, for
example, argued after the Enron and Worldcom debacles that the antidote to such problems was not more ethics in business schools (though
Prentice, a highly respected professor of business law at the University
of Texas, did not oppose such a proposal) but more law; after all, he
said, what happened in these turn of the century scandals were flouting
of extant law itself.86 Similarly, Aneel Karnani, a highly respected professor of Strategy at the University of Michigan, argued in the Wall Street
Journal, that ethics was not a needed topic in business schools.87 If “ethics pays,” then Strategy could easily handle its integration into business
planning and perhaps do so better than philosophers.88
Perhaps it is, indeed, possible for Strategy or Law to handle all ethical issues confronting business. To date, however, the record does not
suggest that they do so in any comprehensive way. Law perpetually
reacts to the scandal du jour and while such reaction may be quite valu80. Id.
81. Id.
82. But see, e.g., RICHARD C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES (1985) (proposing
a form of biological determinism which questions whether a concept of “ethics” is even
possible).
83. See KANT, supra note 8.
84. See, e.g., DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 95 (1997).
85. Robert Prentice, Lessons Learned in Business School, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/20/opinion/20PREN.htmlex=.
86. Id.
87. Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
23, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527487033380045752301
12664504890.
88. Id.
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able to reign in egregious behavior, the law does tend to be slow and
over-inclusive, thus requiring supplementation to be effective. Moreover, the fact that Enron, WorldCom, and others flouted the law suggests
that there was missing motivation sufficient to respect existing law.89
While Strategy may also be able to anticipate the market potential of
moral sentiments, the record of quality management90 and environmental management91 tend to find their origin in non-economic values
that a social market asserts in advance of an economic market finding a
way to integrate the values into a business model.
We do not suggest that the study of ethics makes law and management irrelevant either. Instead, we have proposed that these three be
integrated.92 An essential element of such an integration is some
degree of affection: a desire to do good. As we have already explained,
economists themselves have argued that this element is necessary for
economics itself to successfully function. We have argued for the efficacy of sincerity: that the optimal way in which ethics is effective is when
moral actions are sincerely undertaken.93 In a similar vein, Whole
Foods CEO, John Mackey, has proposed the notion of “Conscious Capitalism” which also seeks to encourage businesses to seek moral goods
and by so doing, become more competitive in the market.
We believe that business is good because it creates value, it is ethical
because it is based on voluntary exchange, it is noble because it can elevate our existence, and it is heroic because it lifts people out of poverty
and creates prosperity.94
Mackey’s Whole Foods puts this into practice by partnering with
Fair Trade organizations as a way to provide value that is shared by key
stakeholders in terms of good working conditions, wages, and fair
prices as opposed to simply “creating value” in terms of higher stock
prices for the shareholders.95
Though not nearly as daring as Mackey’s claim, Harvard Business
School’s Lynn Paine argued for the concept of Organizational Integrity.96 Paine argued that employees simply are not motivated to comply
with the law; one must build in aspiration quests to inspire them to even
attempt to reach the level of basic compliance.97 Linda Treviño and
Gary Weaver studied the efficacy of legal compliance programs and
89. Prentice, supra note 85.
90. See John C. Anderson, Manus Rungtusanatham, & Roger G. Schroeder, A Theory
of Quality Management Underlying the Deming Management Method, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 472
(1994).
91. See Mark Starik & Gordon P. Rands, Weaving an Integrative Web: Multilevel and
Multisystem Perspectives of Ecologically Sustainable Organizations, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 908
(1995).
92. Alexandra Countess of Fredriksborg & Timothy L. Fort, The Paradox of Pharmaceutical CSR, BUS. HORIZONS (forthcoming 2014).
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., JOHN MACKEY & RAJENDRA SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING
THE HEROIC SPIRIT OF BUSINESS (2013).
95. Id. at 273.
96. See Paine, supra note 3.
97. Id. at 111.
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found that they worked when notions of procedural fairness, at a minimum, resulted in even-handed application of the relevant laws.98 We
will return to these integrations of law, economics, and ethics later in
this paper, but for now simply wish to show that there have been some
early efforts at integrating them.
As a predicate to such an integration, we proceed to an overview of
the study of corporate culture in order to identify the traits and levers
in Part II. By identifying these consensus traits and levers, we propose
to establish more specific points and ways in which corporate culture
can be directed toward more effective integration of the law, economics, and ethics in Part III. That integration will be with a particular eye
toward how law and ethics can complement an already existing ethical
culture.
II.

THE CULTURAL ISSUE

Major “whistleblowing” cases over the past ten to fifteen years have
focused on cultures that have gone off-track, including Enron,99
Worldcom,100 and the Bernie Madoff Ponzi Scheme.101 In the aftermath of the mortgage meltdown of a few years ago, similar kinds of
greed-driven cultures were reported within the financial industry, even
among some high-ranking officials who reported that major institutions
sought to “rip the eyeballs out of their own clients.”102 Woes of some
pharmaceutical companies, such as GlaxoSmithKline’s $3 billion fine
for fraud, suggest that problematic cultures reach beyond the financial
sector.103 Indeed, similar charges hold true with respect to Edward
Snowden’s charges of the overreach and hubris of intelligence-gathering agencies.104
It is hardly surprising then, that both practitioners and scholars
focus significant attention on issues of corporate culture. Such concerns with culture extend beyond a desire to avoid scandal. From a
98. See Linda Klebe Treviño et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works
and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131 (1999).
99. See C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron, J. OF ACCOUTANCY 41, 41
(2002), available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2002/Apr/TheRise
AndFallOfEnron.htm.
100. See Theodore F. di Stefano, WorldCom’s Failure: Why Did It Happen?, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Aug. 19, 2005, 7:00 AM), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/45542
.html.
101. See Robert Lenzner, Berni Madoff’s $50 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FORBES (Dec. 12,
2008, 6:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/12/madoff-ponzi-hedge-pf-ii-in_rl_
1212croesus_inl.html.
102. Greg Smith, Why I am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/opinion/why-i-am-leaving-goldman-sachs.html?
pagewanted=all.
103. Charles Riley & Emily Jane Fox, GlaxoSmithKline in $3 Billion Fraud Settlement,
MONEY (Jul. 2, 2012, 12:49 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/02/news/companies/
GlaxoSmithKline-settlement/.
104. See Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden: How the Spy Story of the Age Leaked Out, THE
GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/11/edwardsnowden-nsa-whistleblower-profile.
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business standpoint, there has become widespread recognition that a
culture of a company matters to business performance.
A.

Starting Points on Culture

The realization that culture matters to performance has caught the
attention of scholars as well. In their influential book, Diagnosing and
Changing Organizational Culture,105 Cameron and Quinn provide a short
case study from the work of General Motors in the 1950s that demonstrates the financial potential inherent in changing from a dysfunctional corporate culture to one that is positive and constructive.
To avoid unionization, GM built plants in southern and western
states, a strategy that not surprisingly did not sit well with the United
Auto Workers Union and others, resulting in a highly conflicted work
environment.106 The Fremont, California plant with 5,000 workers that
built the Chevrolet Nova was particularly problematic; in 1982, the
plant featured low productivity, twenty percent absenteeism, 5,000
grievances filed, three wildcat strikes, and costs of assembling the car
thirty percent higher than its Japanese competitors.107 Sales dropped,
quality was ranked worst in the company, and customer satisfaction with
the Nova “had hit rock bottom.”108 While the company had tried various strategies focused on quality, human resources, incentives, and control systems, nothing worked.109 Finally, GM decided to partner with its
competitor, Toyota, to build a tighter car, offering the Fremont plant
for the new automobile with a requirement that the plant not be
remodeled and the old equipment was to be used; moreover, Toyota
had to hire the most senior UAW workers (required because of a contract provision related to joint ventures) so that the most alienated of
the workforce would be used.110 Toyota agreed with the proviso that
Japanese managers would run the facility.111
The plant transitioned from producing the Nova to the Geo Prism
and the Toyota Corolla and the results were startling. Absenteeism
dropped from twenty percent to two percent; unresolved grievances
dropped from 2,000 to zero, total annual grievances dropped from
5,000 to 2,000, wildcat strikes fell from three to zero; assembly costs
dropped from thirty percent above Japanese competition to the same;
productivity went from the worst in GM to double the GM average;
quality went from the worst at GM to the best and the same result held
true for customer satisfaction as well.112
105. KIM S. CAMERON & ROBERT E. QUINN, DIAGNOSING AND CHANGING ORGANIZACULTURE: THROUGH THE COMPETING VALUES FRAMEWORK (3d ed., 2011).
106. Id. at 14.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 15.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 16.
112. Id. at 16–17.

TIONAL
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Cameron and Quinn argue that while there may have been many
reasons for the improvement, an interview with one UAW member captured the reason for the change the best.
This UAW member said that prior to the joint venture, he would go
home at night smirking about the things he had thought up during the
day to mess up the system. He would leave his sandwich behind the
door panel of a car, for example. “A month later, the customer would
be driving down the road and wouldn’t be able to figure out where that
terrible smell was coming from. It would be my rotten sandwich in the
door,” he chuckled to himself. “Or he would put loose screws in a compartment of the frame that was to be welded shut. People riding in the
car would never be able to tell exactly where that rattle was coming
from because it would reverberate throughout the entire car. They
never figure it out,” he said. “Now,” he commented, “Because the number of job classifications has been so dramatically reduced [from more
than 150 to 8], we have all been allowed to have personal business cards
and to make up our own job titles. The title I put on my card is ‘Director of Welding Improvement’.” His job was to monitor robots that spotwelded parts of the frame together. “Now when I got to a San Francisco
49ers game or a Golden State Warriors game or a shopping mall, I look
for Toyota Corollas in the parking lot. When I see one, I take out my
business card and write on the back of it, ‘I made your car. Any
problems, call me[.]’ I put it under the windshield wiper of the car. I
do it because I feel personally responsible for those cars.”113
Cameron and Quinn claim that the difference reflects a deep organizational change about how employees think about the company and
their role in it.114
B.
1.

The Prima Facie Case

Culture: Anthropology, Sociology, or Psychology

Cameron and Quinn’s study of corporate culture has been very
influential. The survey tool they use to diagnose cultural issues, called
the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument, has been used by
over 10,000 companies.115 As we will see, there are other assessment
tools and cultural frameworks, but given the seminal nature of their
work, it is worth obtaining a sense of the dynamics of corporate culture
first through their work.
Noting that there are more than 150 definitions of culture,116
Cameron and Quinn summarize that there are two main approaches to
the understanding of culture: organizations have culture (a sociological
113. Id. at 17.
114. Id. at 16.
115. About the Organizational and Cultural Assessment Instrument, OCAI-ONLINE, http:/
/www.ocai-online.com/about-the-Organizational-Culture-Assessment-Instrument-OCAI
(last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
116. See CAMERON & QUINN, supra note 105, at 18 (citing CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, ALFRED
LOUIS KROEBER & WAYNE UNTEREINER, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND
DEFINITIONS (1952)).
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view) and organizations are culture (an anthropological view) with the
predominant view trending toward the sociological, with a consensus
that “the concept of culture refers to the taken-for-granted values,
underlying assumptions, expectations, and definitions that characterize
organizations and their members.”117 It was only in the 1980s, though,
that serious scholarship was devoted to the notion of corporate culture
in terms of tying it to corporate performance.118 The reason for the
delay in this area’s development, they argue, is that culture was often
left as a description of “how things are around here” and generally was
not reflected on until challenged.119 Indeed, this becomes very much
Cameron and Quinn’s point: until challenged by incompatible values,
culture is assumed.120 Metaphorically connecting this to language, they
state that “most people did not wake up this morning making a conscious decision about which language to speak. Only when confronted
with a different language or asked specific questions about their language do people become aware that language is one of their defining
assumptions.”121
Assumptions give rise to contracts and norms that govern human
interactions in the organization and they, in turn, give rise to artifacts
such as the buildings in which people work, the clothes they wear, and
the kind of office they inhabit—as well as logs, mission statements and
formal corporate goals.122 Those then lead to the actual conduct of
individuals in the company.123 If one is to change culture, each level,
they argue, needs to be addressed.124 They further argue that “culture”
is more permanent than “climate,” which “consists of temporary attitudes, feelings, and perceptions.”125
The ethical climate approach to ethical issues in organization
comes from psychology. It is not only the culture scholars who argue
for a difference between culture and climate; scholars focusing on the
idea of climate also claim that climate is associated with the sense of
psychology and the culture with anthropology.126 The ethical climate
scholars focus on issues that give rise to there being more conscious
attention focused on ethical issues, so that moral awareness and sentiments are cultivated, typically through strong leadership, so that sensitivity to stakeholders and related ethical issues is enhanced.127 Thus,
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 19.
120. Id. at 19–20.
121. Id. at 20.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE AND CULTURE (Benjamin Schneider ed.,
1990)).
126. ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE OFFICER ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL CULTURE BUILDING: A
MODERN BUSINESS IMPERATIVE 10 (hereinafter ECOA STUDY).
127. Bart Victor & John B. Cullen, The Organizational Bases of Ethical Work Climates,
33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 101 (1988); but see Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Relationship
Between Corporate Ethical Climate and Stakeholder Management (Jan. 31, 2010)
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the ethical climate scholars claim a differentiation from the culture
scholars in two respects: one is that the source of study is different—
psychology rather than anthropology—and also with an emphasis more
on normative sentiments rather than anthropology’s attention to structure.128 Thus, the ethical climate scholarship claim is that it has more
to do with ethical issues than corporate culture issues, which may have
little to do with ethics, per se, and more about how culture impacts
productivity.
While we acknowledge the disciplinary difference between anthropology and psychology (and sociology as well), the differentiations
seem akin to the laborious effort many scholars make to disentangle
corporate social responsibility from business ethics and corporate citizenship, governance, and sustainability. To be sure, drawing on different disciplines leads to new and different insights, but they still attend
to a common phenomenon, whether in terms of corporate responsibility issues or, for purposes of this paper, ethical corporate culture.
Indeed, for purposes of our paper, we assert that “ethical” corporate
culture integrates analysis of corporate culture with the ethically-oriented “ethical climate” so that the insights of both can be brought to
bear. Further, it does seem, as will be shown, that corporate culture
often deals with normative issues.
2.

The Competing Values Framework

Given its stature and persuasiveness in the business world, the
Competing Values framework requires closer examination. In providing that, we will also show that this framework maps exceptionally well
on an integration of law, ethics, and economics we have already introduced. Further, both the Competing Values framework and our tentative integration directly correlate with a deep rooting of corporate
values within the biological and physical sciences and also with a contemporary model of business trust-building. Our task is to elaborate
upon this consilience in order to then propose insights for the maintenance of ethical cultures with legal norms.
Cameron and Quinn’s research shows that there are four main
types of corporate cultures: Clan, Hierarchy, Adhocracy, and Market.
The Clan culture has a strong feeling of an extended family with the
leaders of the firm seen as mentors or even parents.129 Employees
share a good deal of personal information at work and this carries over
to strong sensitivity to customers.130 Human resources professionals
focus on long-term development with resulting aspects of loyalty, cohesion, morale, teamwork, participation, and consensus.131 Employee
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University) (on file with author),
available at http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/89184544.html?FMT=ABS.
128. See ECOA STUDY, supra note 126, at 12.
129. See OCAI-ONLINE, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT 5
(2010), available at http://www.ocai-online.com/userfiles/file/ocai_pro_example_re
port.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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empowerment and open communications become crucial in this familial environment.132
The Hierarchical culture, on the other hand, is very formalized
and structured.133 Smooth, long-term, efficient performance is valued
with leaders being viewed as coordinators and organizers.134 Procedures, formal rules, and policies hold the organization together and
attention to employees focuses on secure employment and
predictability.135
The Market Culture is a competitive, results-oriented organization
that tends to feature attributes of tough, demanding, hard-driven, and
competitive people.136 Winning motivates the participants with success
being defined in tangible measures of performance and market penetration; leaders are hard-driving competitors.137
The Adhocracy culture tends to be entrepreneurial and creative.138 Leaders are innovators and risk-takers and thereby encourage
such traits in employees.139 What binds members of the organization
together are a commitment to innovation and a desire to be cutting
edge with success measured in the creation of new, unique products
and services.140 In an innovative culture, creating new standards and
finding creative new approaches become hallmark strategies.141
FLEXIBILITY

CLAN

ADHOCRACY

INTERNAL
FOCUS

EXTERNAL
FOCUS
HIERARCHY

MARKET

CONTROL
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

142

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Leon J. Schimmoeller, Leadership Styles in Competing Organizational Cultures, 10
LEADERSHIP REV. 125, 128 (2010), available at http://www.leadershipreview.org/
2010summer/article3_summer_2010.asp.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE101.txt

22

unknown

Seq: 22

20-APR-15

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

8:18

[Vol. 29

As with most academic typologies, Cameron and Quinn’s framework is set out in an archetypical fashion, but they assert that any given
business culture will be a mix of these four types.143 The methodology
to implement their research then takes place in two steps. First, they
administer a straightforward survey based on their research.144 The
survey is comprised of six questions (Dominant Characteristics, Organizational Leadership, Management of Employees, Organizational Glue,
Strategic Emphasis, and Criteria of Success) and respondents are given
100 points to allocate for each question along the attributes of the four
culture types.145 The survey is administered twice: the first time, participants are asked to answer the survey according to what currently exists
in the workplace, and the second time the participants are to answer
the survey according to what they would like to see in the workplace.146
The difference between the two, then, provides a road map for how to
make change and move from what currently exists to what is
preferred.147
This question of change becomes very much the point. Cameron
and Quinn name their approach the “Competing Values” for good reason.148 Values underlying hierarchy and stability exist in considerable
tension with those emphasizing innovation, risk-taking, and creating
new standards. Similarly, tensions can be found in comparing these
four types of culture and would be expected to continue as change
occurs.149 Yet, if one assumes that some kind of change is desirable,
then it would seem that a value cluster committed to change is automatically elevated over others. Indeed, we would propose that the value
cluster of Adhocracy—the entrepreneurial, creative, innovative set of
assumptions that seeks to set out new standards—would be the motivating value to balance among the three other quadrants, which otherwise
seem to have little orientation to change per se. If this is true, then a
reconceptualization of the framework would look instead like this:

143. See CAMERON & QUINN, supra note 105, at 139.
144. Id. at 24–25.
145. Id. at 25.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. It is an open question, however, as to whether these values are “competing” or
not. For example, values emphasizing harmony, on the one hand, and competition, on
the other, may be able to be balanced with conscious effort. One could envision a sports
team, for instance, that features stiff competition for playing time among players, but with
loyalty and cohesion still held together not only through a commitment to winning (a
Market value) but also by bonding among team members.
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Clan

Adhocracy

Hierarchy

Market

This reconceptualization accords with the tri-partite model we have
previously sketched.150 In this reconceptualization, Hierarchy would
map with legal, compliance notions of business; Market would map
onto the economic; and Clan would map with a moral dimension. Our
reconceptualization aims not at claiming a definitive understanding of
exact contours of such a graphic, but to more impressionistically locate
the tension among these values in a way that brings the “competing”
values closer to a common language used by other culture theorists and
also in a way that is embedded deeply within our very nature.
Moreover, we would argue that this model further accords well
with a leading framework within the field of business ethics. William
Frederick, relying on naturalistic foundations rather than on philosophical principles, has long argued that in all nature, there are three value
clusters: Economizing, Ecologizing and Power-Aggrandizing.151 Poweraggrandizing values are those that seek status and hierarchy.152 They
exist in the animal world, for instance with competition to become the
dominant lion in a given pride or the dominant wolf in a pack.153
Power-aggrandizing values also exist in the human world in quests for
power and status—the corporate world is no exception.154 While Frederick tends to be quite negative in his assessment of power-aggrandizing, it can have a stabilizing feature in the creation of laws and
regulation that assure that rogue behavior is punished by authorities.
This is the basis for the trust-model of business ethics developed by Fort
that argues that individuals (and society) reposes trust in a business
when an outside party (typically the government though laws) can prevent or punish egregious behavior.155 It provides the link to the legal
compliance approach with which we began this article.
150. See Alexandra & Fort, supra note 92.
151. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. FREDERICK, VALUES NATURE AND CULTURE IN THE AMERICAN
CORPORATION 9 (1995).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 146.
154. Id. at 151.
155. See TIMOTHY L. FORT, BUSINESS, INTEGRITY AND PEACE (R. Edward Freeman et
al. eds., 2007).
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Frederick’s economizing values refers to the naturalistic impulse to
convert raw materials into usable forms. This exists even in the plant
world through photosynthesis and in the animal world through basic
metabolism.156 Frederick argues that business provides a social analogue to this function by converting raw materials into usable products
and services for society as well.157 This naturalistic value maps well onto
the economic approach to business with which we began this article.
Frederick’s ecologizing value pertains to the way in which there is
long-term benefit to mutually beneficial relationships that give rise to
the ecological system that allows life itself to flourish.158 The entire
ecosystem, of course, is based on these mutualisms where one creature’s existence is embedded within a series of other relationships with
other creatures.159 From the standpoint of human organization, Frederick argues that this is found in the communities in which we live as
well, where mutual interdependence is crucial, a feature that maps well
with notions of the affective, which also is part of the beginning of this
article.
Like Cameron and Quinn, Frederick argues that these are competing, mutually exclusive value clusters that present the challenge of how
they can be integrated.160 One does that, for Frederick, in two ways.
One is through what he calls “techno-symbolic” values that are simply
our rational capability to recombine, restructure, and to learn consciously how to adapt to new environments.161 This capability is essential to our human nature and is the basis for everything from the
creation of language to the design of complex corporate culture and
nation-states.162 The other way in which these three value clusters
come into some kind of relationship with each other is through what
Frederick calls “x-factor” values.163 These are the idiosyncratic features
of individuals that spark change and differences in any given organization.164 We argue that these are consistent with leadership and that the
combination of leadership along with the human capability to re-vision,
re-structure, and to change—a set of assumptions and traits that seem
to map well onto Cameron’s and Quinn’s Adhocracy Values—explain
the culture-building map and opportunities for augmenting corporate
culture.
Moreover, as we argue in the next section, we believe that this mapping and conceptualization accords with a meta-analysis of other corporate culture maps that have been created. In the figure below, we take
thirteen leading frameworks that assess corporate culture and ethical
climate. Eleven focus on culture per se and the final two address issues
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Frederick, supra note 151, at 156.
at 163.
at 187–89.
at 157–62.
at 9.
at 188–92.
at 16.
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of ethical climate. As noted earlier, the differences between the two
tend to be downplayed when considered within the four-part framework for which we argue. Moreover, while judgment calls could be disputed as to which of our four categories we place the dimensions of
each of the culture framework, for the most part, there appears to be a
consilience suggesting that the model captures much of the scholarship
generating on the topic.
COMPARISON OF LEADING CORPORATE CULTURE MODELS AS
RELATED TO FREDERICKS’ NATURALIST FRAMEWORK

Competing
Values165
OCI166
Denison167
Culture Web168

Culture Map
Corp
Evolution169
Deal &
Kennedy170
Barrett171
Frontline172

Economizing

Ecologizing

Power
Aggrandizing

Market

Clan

Hierarchy

TechnoSymbolic/x
Factor
Adhocracy

Satisfaction of
Needs
Mission

People

Security

Task

Systems

Involvement

Consistency
Power
Structures;
Organizational
Structures;
Control Systems;
Rituals &
Routines
Evidence Values Levers
Structures
Process; Tough
Guy/Macho;
Work Hard; Play
Hard

Physical
Productivity
Rewards;
Rewards &
Recognition

Emotional
Environment;
Teamwork

Objectives

Adaptability
Symbols; Stories

Assumptions
Technology;
Skills
Bet Your
Company

Mental; Spiritual
Developmental
Opportunities
for Employees;
Leadership

165. See CAMERON & QUINN, supra note 105.
166. See Organizational Culture Inventory, HUMAN SYNERGISTICS (Aug. 2014), http://
www.humansynergistics.com/docs/default-source/product-info-sheets/oci_product_info
_sheet_v1-0_nopricing.pdf?sfvrsn=4.
167. See Daniel Denison, DENISON CONSULTING, http://www.denisonconsulting.com
(last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
168. See The Culture Web, MINDTOOLS.COM, http://www.mindtools.com/pages/
article/newSTR_90.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
169. See Corporate Evolution, MINDTOOLS.COM, http://www.mindtools.com/pages/
article/newSTR_90.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
170. See TERRENCE A. DEAL & ALLAN A. KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES: THE RITES
AND RITUALS OF CORPORATE LIFE (1982).
171. See Richard Barratt, Barrett Model, BARRETT VALUES CENTRE (2009), http://
www.valuescentre.com/culture/?sec=barrett_model.
172. See Corporate Culture, FRONTLINE LEARNING (2010), http://frontlinelearning.
com/Corporate_Culture.html.
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Leadership;
Stories;
Language
Determination
of goals for the
members of the
organization

The rows across the top of this chart represent Frederick’s value
clusters. The column on the far left contains leading corporate culture
and ethical climate frameworks. The cells then demonstrate how the
leading cultural and climate frameworks utilize concepts similar to
Fredericks’ model. What this chart shows is that there is a great deal of
commonality vis-à-vis these frameworks, on the whole, and Frederick’s
model.
What is also striking is the emphasis that appears on dimensions
around the final category, which pertains to leadership, motivation,
desire, and aspiration. While each category is consistently represented
in the four cells, only this last category is featured in every cell;
moreover, motivation appears to be emphasized more often than in the
other cells. This suggests that the dimension of the affective—of
leadership, x-factor values, and a working culture that is based on more
than just compliance and economics—may be more crucial than any of
the others.
Such an inference, of course, needs to be tempered by the fact that
most of these analyses of culture are offered with an aim to change an
existing culture.177 Such an aim to change tautologically implies a
motivation to do things in a different way. For that matter, even if only
understanding rather than change per se drives a company to consider
corporate culture, such an examination of corporate life has its value.
Either way, the critical perspective of aiming for something better
remains crucial to the creation of a preferred corporate culture or
climate. This suggests that the affective dimension—an internally
driven desire to achieve something—is essential for achieving an ideal
(or at least workable) corporate culture.
173. See LEADERSHIP CIRCLE (2014), http://www.theleadershipcircle.com.
174. See The McKinsey 7S Framework, MINDTOOLS.COM, http://www.mindtools.com/
pages/article/newSTR_91 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
175. See Linda Klebe Treviño, Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-Situation Interactionist Model, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 601, 601–17 (1986).
176. See Deborah Vidaver-Cohen, Moral Climate in Business Firms: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Change, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1211, 1211–26 (1998).
177. See CAMERON & QUINN, supra note 105, at 67 (using Apple as an example).
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AFFECTIVE & GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES

So far, we have not suggested that one kind of culture is ethically
preferable to another. A hierarchical structure has served the military
for millennia, producing men and women of great rectitude, honor,
and discipline. At those times when a company has spun out of control
with many ethical or legal violations, it may well be that a hierarchical
structure is necessary to impose the needed controls.178 An outside,
market focus may be called for when a company’s outlook has become
too insular without regard for the variety of values existing outside the
firm; this could be true when a company has failed to keep up with
changes in the economic market, but so too when it has failed to keep
up with changes in the social or political market with issues pertaining
to diversity. A family-oriented business—one that is family-owned for
example—may have been able to create an organization like an
extended family, but such an organization may find it difficult to sustain that atmosphere as it grows and expands. An entrepreneurial firm
may reach the point where it can become so entrepreneurial that it
consistently eschews structure or bonds of relationship, creating a selfcentered environment that may not even have a market payoff.179 We
believe that this is one reason why Cameron and Quinn simply identify
their cultural change model as one of moving from an existing structure to a preferred structure.180
Yet, clearly, Cameron and Quinn are saying much more than this.
As their paradigmatic example, summarized earlier in this article shows,
their framework provides a reminder that attending to issues of human
pride, autonomy, relationships, and responsibility have both an independent value and also one that makes for more productive workplaces.
That message comes through in the analysis of other leading cultural
change models, each one indicating the importance of the affective.
A.

The Essential Dimension of the Affective For Ethical Culture

At the heart of ethics and ethical cultures are moral sentiments
that feature a human quality of caring nature for others. Some may
characterize this as our human social nature181 while others may go
further and call it a moral aspect of our human nature.182 Whatever
characterization one makes of these natural sentiments, at the heart of
any ethics—and at the heart of any change itself—is a desire to care
about something.183 And so, if there is a perception that a culture needs
178. Id. at 8.
179. Id. at 67 (using Apple as an example).
180. Id.
181. Elliot D. Cohen, You Are a Social Animal, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 21, 2010),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/what-would-aristotle-do/201009/you-are-socialanimal.
182. See, e.g., Paul R. Lawrence, The Biological Base of Morality?, 4 BUS., SCI., AND
ETHICS, 59 (2004).
183. To be sure, it is true that this change could take a dark turn of change to
unethical behavior and culture. Addressing that issue becomes the topic of another
paper.
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to change from a clan to a hierarchy or a hierarchy to a market or any
other variation, the sentiment of motivation becomes the starting point,
immediately followed by the leadership and organizational capability to
change.184 Logically, this elevates affective/adhocracy as the primary
energies for change and an affective, clan-like approach as substantively
aspired to.
For example, Whole Foods CEO John Mackey argues that no entrepreneur goes into business solely for making money.185 There always is
a second, non-economic motive. It may be that the entrepreneur has a
social cause he or she wishes to pursue186 or it may be that he or she
wants to show their father that he or she can be as successful as another
sibling.187 There is always that “something else.” Mackey argues that
the same holds true for employees as well, meaning that a key to success
is to structure work so that employees have an opportunity to fulfill
their “something else” at work; in doing so, Mackey argues that great
passion will be released and the company will be far more effective as
well as its work more meaningful.188 Such a model places significant
power in the hands of employees entrusting them to be mature moral
agents.
To undertake the risk of changing an environment begs the issue
of trust. As we have argued elsewhere, sincerity is an often underappreciated virtue.189 There may be times and places where a company
undertakes an action to gain good publicity and because of a perception that it will pay. What makes those actions especially trustworthy,
though, is when those actions are taken for sincere reasons committed
to the good of the action itself as opposed to the instrumental benefits
that may accrue to the company.190 Paradoxically, it is thus when
actions are taken for their own good that they then have the most
value.191 This holds true for issues pertaining to philanthropy, but we
assert that it would also apply for the disruptive change that accompanies corporate culture. Thus, moral sentiments, strategically developed
and sincerely communicated provide a set of moral values by which
change itself best takes place. Moreover, these particular virtues are
internally derived goods rather than extrinsically required by laws and
controls (associated with hierarchy) and with economic rewards (associated with markets). An optimal corporate culture would most likely be
found in the clan structure with strong adhocracy practices.
That a hierarchically-based or market-based culture may need to
incorporate such virtues in order to achieve an ethical culture does not
strike us as surprising. These virtues are exactly those that define what
an ethical culture would seem to be. The challenge is when a clan and/
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.

CAMERON & QUINN, supra note 105, at 2.
e.g., MACKEY, supra note 94, at 20.
at 45.
at 86.
Alexandra & Fort, supra note 92.
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or adhocracy-based culture has reason to augment legal and economic
dimensions as it grows and especially as it grows into geographic areas
that have strong external law oversight and requirements. Cameron
and Quinn state that:
Over time, companies tend to gravitate toward an emphasis on
hierarchy and market culture types. Once their culture profiles
become dominated by those lower two quadrants, it seems difficult for them to develop cultures dominated by the upper two
quadrants. It’s almost as if a law of gravity takes over. The lower
quadrants have a tendency to remain dominant the longest. It
takes a great deal of effort and leadership to make the change to a
clan or adhocracy culture.192

B.

Governance Implications: Business As Mediating Institution

Such a nature accords well with the notion of an extended family
where affective values are more likely to persist in future generations of
leadership when those generations maintain a long term commitment
to the history of the family business, take pride in its ability to make an
impact, and respect the individuals who are part of the organization.
Such commitments can, of course, also be extended to non-family
members even when no one in the given organization is related to each
other.
For example, Kristin Hahn, a major Hollywood film producer
explicitly sets out to create exactly such an atmosphere of extended
family when putting together a team to make a film. Hahn says, “[w]e
really look for people we know and who we trust and who also will bring
energy and fun to the film. Many talented people are available, but it’s
important to bring people together that can work together like a close
community.”193
Genetic relationships may be one way to engender a caring culture,
but sociologically, the important dimension is not family per se, but
running a business as a mediating institution. This sociological term
includes families as well as other small institutions where there is faceto-face engagement, a closeness, so that individuals experience consequences of moral actions and thereby gain moral character.194
Natural law theorists have long relied on this concept to claim that
these mediating institutions foster the development of moral character.
Studies in archeology and neurobiology substantiate the point that
human groups experience breaking points at group sizes with limits of
6, 30, 150, and, finally, 500.195 As population sizes grow larger, hierar192. See CAMERON & QUINN, supra note 105, at 79.
193. Kristin Hahn, Presentation at Professor Fort’s Cultural Norms in Global Business Class (Feb. 2013).
194. See TIMOTHY L. FORT, ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE: BUSINESS AS MEDIATING INSTITUTION 16 (2001) [hereinafter ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE.].
195. Id. at 49–51.
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chy tends to be relied upon more, including in business.196 This
insight has implications for corporate culture. Economies of scale provide incentives for companies to grow ever larger as well as more global,
but affective sentiments thrive in small organizations, thus suggesting
that companies wanting to retain (or introduce) more affective sentiments must design corporations to allow for sub-groupings within the
organization. Moreover, a clear sense of purpose, reinforced by leadership, can further allow a commitment to common goals that can foster
this affectivity.197
Recall the earlier example of J&J. A family company until the 1944
initial public offering, J&J stood as a very clan-like, family-like, ecologizing organization. In an effort to preserve that culture at the time of the
IPO, the founders of the company articulated J&J’s famous Corporate
Credo, which detailed the responsibilities the company maintained.198
Those responsibilities began with the responsibilities to the parents,
doctors, nurses and consumers who used the pharmaceutical’s products
and then extended, sequentially, to the company’s employees, suppliers, communities, and governments.199 The final responsibility was to
the company’s shareholders with a closing assertion that if the company
lived up to these other stakeholder obligations, the shareholders would
receive a fair return on their investment.200
Over the years, employees reported that the Credo and its values
were very central to the life of the workplace.201 In job interviews and
in annual reviews, the importance of the Credo was reinforced and,
sometimes, rewards were provided to those employees who had the best
annual story of the Credo at work.202 This commitment was put to the
test when J&J confronted the 1982 tampering with its leading brand,
Tylenol.203
Yet, over the past ten years or so, J&J’s image has been tarnished
with multiple product recalls.204 Reports of the company’s internal
196. See also ROBIN DUNBAR, GOSSIP, GROOMING, AND THE EVOLUTION OF LANGUAGE
(1996). Dunbar has other examples as well. He goes on to note that the Mormons followed a pattern similar to the Hutterites, writing that when Brigham Young led the
Mormons to Utah, he divided his flock of 5,000 into groups of 150. Dunbar also reports
that a study conducted by the Church of England found that the ideal congregation size
is less than 200, and that over the past one hundred years, the military company unit has
ranged from 130 (the number in Gandhi’s ashram) to 170. These anthropological realities suggest that certain capacities are universal among human beings. The findings
themselves do not suggest universal norms, but do indicate basic human capacities that
may have an impact on how human beings relate to each other.
197. See, e.g., FORT, supra note 194 (providing an extensive discussion of the history
and sociological dimensions of mediating institutions as applied to business).
198. See JOHNSON & JOHNSON, supra note 14.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Human Resources Practices of Johnson and Johnson, BEKNOWLEDGE.COM, http://
www.beknowledge.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/16790Human%20Resources%20
Practices%20of%20Johnson%20and%20Johnson.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
202. Id.
203. See Moore, supra note 14.
204. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, New Recalls by Johnson & Johnson Raise Concern About
Quality Control Improvements, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
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emphasis also have diminished, which perhaps might explain why a
group of J&J shareholders filed a derivative suit against the company’s
Board of Directors for failing to perpetuate the ethical culture of the
firm and thereby leading to persistent legal problems.205 In a settlement with the shareholders, the Board committed to a stronger system
of controls and values to return the company to its history.206 Whether
or not the company will be successful remains to be seen, but the history of the company over the past fifty years demonstrates the threat of
relying on hierarchical structures (power-aggrandizing) and pursuit of
markets (economizing) and these values’ capacities for crowding out of
the affective (ecologizing).
There are governance implications for companies that seek to preserve a prized ethical culture while needing to attend to legal and economic pressures. If a central attribute of an ethical culture is that
individuals within the culture are themselves moral agents with beliefs,
values, feelings, and sentiments, the external pressures associated with
hierarchy and markets pose real threats, especially given the tendency
for companies to sag into these areas and to stay there.207
One way to do this is through the work of strong leadership, which
does not dictate values per se, but rather creates an atmosphere where
individuals are equipped and encouraged to be responsible moral leaders in their own right. Sometimes called transformational leadership,
this style of leadership places great weight in the engagement of the
individual, often charismatic CEO, who demands and inspires people to
undertake an approach in a certain heroic way.208
A second way also requires much of leadership, but in a way that
lends itself to a flatter governance structure and style. In this model,
the CEO recuses him or herself from making decisions in order to provide the room for others in the organization to assert their own leadership. This itself is a values-based model of management, which would
devolve responsibilities first to an active board of directors, but then
cascading down as well through senior management and into the ranks
of employees.209
A third, institutional way to achieve this result would be to structure the organizations in which people work to accord with the neurological capabilities and sentiments of individuals so that people work in
a business that acts as a mediating institution.210
09/13/business/new-recalls-by-johnson-johnson-raise-concern-about-quality-control-im
provements.html?_r=0.
205. In re Johnson & Johnson Derivative Litig., 900 F. Supp. 3d 467 (D.N.J. 2012).
206. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement for In re Johnson & Johnson Derivative Litig., supra note 205, available at http://www.millerchevalier.com/portalresource/JJ
_settlement.
207. See CAMERON & QUINN, supra note 105.
208. See, e.g., MACKEY, supra note 94.
209. See Alexandra & Fort, supra note 92, at 16; see also Lynn Paine and Sarah
Mavrinac, AES Honeycomb, HARV. BUS. SCH. CASE COLLECTION (1994 (revised 2009)).
210. See generally ETHICS AND GUIDANCE, supra note 194.
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Trust-Building and The Affective

We thus come to the final aspect of our argument. Corporate culture is comprised of three forces, which are integrated, blended, and
balanced by a fourth. Whether one names those forces as Hierarchical,
Market, and Clan or Power-Aggrandizing, Economizing, and Ecologizing, those forces persist in human organizations. An entrepreneurial
dimension—also known as a techno-symbolic aspect—is the force that
creates new arrangements with these three forces. With cultures tending to sag toward hierarchical and market-driven structures and behaviors and with more robust cultures being called for, the emphasis on
both effective and ethical cultures seems to be one that finds ways to
cultivate the affective dimension and place it within the life of corporate culture.
As just noted, one governance mechanism to achieve this might be
to create a very flat governance structure with leadership specifically
insisting on not taking on all the powers that are available to him or to
her. A second governance mechanism could be a leadership model
that more directly emphasizes value-based management throughout the
company to train and to empower employees to make good, solid,
mature decisions. A third mechanism would be to specifically structure
the organization itself so that individuals find themselves in a mediating
institution with associated small sizes. With any of these approaches,
the core message is to trust individuals in the organization to make
good decisions and to make sure those decisions are made well—not
from the threat of punishment and coercion but from the investment
in training and respect. Or, to put it otherwise, the primary message is
to foster the creation of trustworthy employees and to respect them.
Such an approach, of course, runs risks of individuals jeopardizing
companies with legal systems with very strong compliance enforcement.
Does a value-based, trusting approach to corporate culture insulate a
company from prosecution pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? The question answers itself reasonably well.
A company may be able to maintain its commitment to an affective
culture if the members of that culture are provided with training and
information about the relevant law applicable to them. To return to
the comments of Robert Prentice, but with a twist, a way to foster ethical business behavior is through having employees learn business law as
well. The same answer, in fact, has already been provided on the economic side of the equation. Companies often teach employees the
basics of economics and finance so that they can understand company
decisions and make such decisions themselves as well.211 Thus, the way
in which a company with a strong, affective culture can maintain that
culture is to maintain its commitment to empowerment of individuals
within the organization in order for those individuals to continue to
make decisions on the basis of their internal training, education, and
empowerment. In introducing the law and economics—external
211. See, e.g., Raj Aggarwal and Betty J. Simkins, Open Book Management—Optimizing
Human Capital, 44 BUS. HORIZONS 5 (Sept.–Oct. 2001).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE101.txt

2015]

unknown

Seq: 33

20-APR-15

DEALING WITH LAW IN BUILDING ETHICAL CORPORATE CULTURE

8:18

33

motivators of culture—one integrates them into training as opposed to
making them solely external systems of punishments or rewards.
While this approach answers the question posed at the outset, it
also provides insight for companies that already align with compliance
and economics (also known as hierarchy and markets). Such companies may need to open their cultures to a more effective approach, but
in doing so, they can find ways to simultaneously maintain robust lawabiding and market-efficacious companies.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Though rooted in the strongest scholarship in corporate culture
and business ethics, our argument is conceptual. It is, in short, that the
affective is often squeezed out of corporate culture, especially as companies grow larger and are also exposed to legal regimes and global markets that place strong pressure on external forces. Yet, the reason that
there is demand for studies and consulting in corporate culture lies in
the fact that law and economics pressures often short-change the very
effectiveness of companies themselves. There is a bottom line weakness
that needs shoring up and the affective is frequently turned to as a way
to do this.
That attention shines a light on companies, then, that already
strongly attend to the affective. Their challenges lie in how to maintain
that desired culture even as legal and market pressures build. The
answer, we argue, is any one—or combination of several—corporate
governance mechanisms that provide strong support for a trained, educated, empowered workforce. This could occur through strong leadership insisting on values-based management; it could occur through
leaders who recuse themselves from decision-making so that others can
take their own leadership roles; it could occur through structuring institutions so that sizes of organizations match the natural capabilities of
individuals who then are in a better position to more spontaneously
take on the empowered positions that lead to pride, caring, and affectivity in general. We do not suggest that these three mechanisms are
the only possible ways to foster such cultures, but we do believe they
provide a strong starting point. Moreover, we suggest that these mechanisms, along with others are better explored through an integration of
the law with the literature of managerial theory and practice with an
emphasis on Board-level strategies and policies.
A desirable next step is both qualitative and quantitative research
that explores the conceptual hypotheses and dimensions we have proposed. Qualitatively, in-depth interviews with both leaders and employees would yield evidence as to ways to integrate the tri-partite structure
in a constructive way. Quantitatively, research measuring the legal, economic, and ethical performance would further shed light on this
relationship.
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